The Zambian Consensus by Briggs, Stefan Jan
Bard College 
Bard Digital Commons 
Senior Projects Spring 2018 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects 
Spring 2018 
The Zambian Consensus 
Stefan Jan Briggs 
Bard College, sb8551@bard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2018 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Theory Commons, Growth and Development 
Commons, International Economics Commons, and the Macroeconomics Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Briggs, Stefan Jan, "The Zambian Consensus" (2018). Senior Projects Spring 2018. 158. 
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2018/158 
This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or 
related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard 
College's Stevenson Library with permission from the 
rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way 
that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For 
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-
holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by 
a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the 
work itself. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@bard.edu. 
The Zambian Consensus 
Senior Project Submitted to 
The Division of Social Studies of Bard College 
by 
Stefan Briggs 
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York 
May 2018 
Acknowledgements 
 
Thank you Sean Turlan, Taylor Briggs, Antje Rilk, Jason Briggs, and 
Taun Toay.
Table of Contents 
Introduction ......................................................................................... 1 
Chapter I: The Resource Curse ........................................................... 3 
Chapter II: Zambia and Neoliberalism ..............................................18 
Chapter III: The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) .......................... 31 
Chapter IV: SAM Observations ........................................................ 45 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 57
Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the development of the Zambian economy. 
Zambia’s history is contextualized within the field of development 
economics, highlighting the limitations of the market-friendly approach 
advocated for by the Washington Consensus. The Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) created by the Zambian Institute for Policy and 
Research Institute (ZIPAR) was further developed in order to 
disaggregate copper and increase the tax on copper exports by 25%. 
The results from the SAM illustrate various observations regarding the 
future of the Zambian economy.  
 Introduction 
Every August without fail, smoke fills the air as Zambia prepares for the rainy season. 
Swaths of land are scorched, intentionally and naturally, in anticipation of the thundering 
downpour. The burning method, commonly referred to as slash and burn, or Chitemene, 
fertilizes the land and clears the bush of snakes. This act is performed on a regular basis in 
anticipation of the rainy season. The price of copper, in contrast, is far from predictable as 
low and volatile copper prices have plagued Zambia since 1964.  
Zambia has faced hardship despite the fact that it possesses copious amounts of a 
metal that powers the infrastructure of the global economy. Economists from developed 
countries offer an explanation for Zambia’s troubles through summoning the supernatural: 
the resources must be cursed. What else could explain the problem? A contextual approach 
pushes the discussion from the supernatural to one grounded in historical observation and 
economic theory. The focus is less on the metal, and more on the consequential impact this 
metal had on shaping the development of the Republic of Zambia. The shift in focus from the 
supply to the demand side is a constant theme running throughout the following five chapters.  
In Chapter I, the ideological underpinnings of the resource curse are explored. The 
post-war period brought with it the genesis of development economics, as questions 
regarding growth in developing economies arose. The source of coppers volatility is found to 
lie in the speculative nature of the asset.  
In Chapter II, the colonial history of Zambia is told through the formation of the 
Copperbelt region. The history of the East Asian economies is reviewed, as the state-led 
approach towards production is identified as an effective method towards generating 
economic development. Zambia’s attempts at emulating this approach through organizing 
global copper producers failed to garner support from the World Bank and the International 
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 Monetary Fund (IMF). The influence of privatization and the Washington Consensus on 
development in Zambia is further explored. 
In Chapter III, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) created by the Zambian Institute  
for Policy and Research (ZIPAR) is further developed. This is the first SAM that explicitly 
disaggregates copper and increases the tax rate on copper exports. The revenue is collected 
and distributed throughout the rural, urban, and business services sectors. The results are 
illustrated and the methodology is covered.  
Chapter IV supports the results from the SAM with theoretical evidence and examines 
the assumptions. Four sundry observations are made about the nature of the Zambian 
economy: Agriculture and the Institution, Taxes and Revenue, Debt Fragility and the 
Multiplier. These observations are made with the goal of guiding and influencing a new 
Zambian Consensus.  
In the conclusion, the issues are synthesized and the future approach of the Zambian 
government is considered.  
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 Chapter I: The Resource Curse 
 
The end of World War II ushered in an era of African independence: nation states 
were born from colonial predecessors. This era simultaneously witnessed the birth of the 
field of economic development, as questions regarding the growth of these nations began to 
form. As Albert Hirschman articulates the subdiscipline of development economics had 
“considerable luster and excitement through the implicit idea that it could slay the dragon of 
backwardness virtually by itself or, at least, that its contribution to this task was central.” 1 
During this twilight phase, a hodgepodge of growth theories and models offered various 
solutions. The eventual preeminence of orthodox solutions would come to shape the policies 
present today. 
During the 1940s, Keynesianism reigned supreme. The success of monetary and fiscal 
policy during WWII reinforced Keynes’ proposition that the government could itself 
effectively support growth and stability. As Kregel explains, “it was natural to look to 
Keynes’s theory as the basis for the formulation of new theories of development.” 2 The 
“pioneers” of development economics assumed Keynesian economics equally relevant to the 
needs of developing countries. After the 1960s, however, neoclassical economics succeeded 
in fundamentally changing the goal of development policy. Instead of typical Keynesian 
interventionist policy, the neoclassical framework advocated for laissez-faire “development 
strategy.” 3 In contrast with the Keynesian focus on the demand side, this supply side 
approach towards development economics manifested itself in the Washington Consensus 
approach that continues to largely dominate the development scene. 
Building off the work of these theories came another breakthrough in the late 1990s
                                                      
1 Hirschman, Albert O. “The Rise and Decline of Development Economics.” Princeton University Press, 2013 (pg. 69) 
2 Kregel, Jan A. “The Effective Demand Approach to Economic Development.” Handbook of Alternative Theories of 
Economic Development. (pg. 2) 
3 Ibid, (pg. 1) 
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that caught the attention of development economists: The Resource Curse. The premise is 
simple: developing nations endowed with natural resources tend to have less economic growth 
and are typified by weaker government institutions. Although coined by Andrew Warner, it 
was Jeffrey Sachs who brought the ‘resource curse’ into mainstream thought. A simple 
heuristic obscured the weak economic data and precarious ideological underpinnings; even 
development academia widely accepted the curse was real, and resource rich countries were, in 
fact, predestined for failure. 
While economics lacks a “universally accepted theory” of economic growth, Sachs 
posits that we lack a universally accepted theory for the causes of the resource curse. Sachs 
describes a country with a ‘resource curse’ as one in which a mineral or simple commodity 
abundant country renders its export sector uncompetitive. As a consequence, resource rich 
nations never successfully pursued “export-led growth.” 4 Sachs essentially reformulates the 
Dutch Disease hypothesis. 
The Dutch Disease is commonly considered to be one of the main driving 
mechanisms of the curse. The term for the Dutch Disease originates from the economic crisis 
experienced by Holland in the 1960s after a large amount of natural gas was discovered. As a 
result, large amounts of foreign capital were injected into the Dutch economy in order to buy 
up the newly discovered gas. The Dutch currency appreciated, making other exports 
relatively more expensive. This process of currency appreciation and the resulting side effects 
is referred to as the Dutch Disease. 
Sachs explains the curse via slow growth rates in nations with high levels of resource 
abundance.
4 Sachs, Jeffrey D, and Andrew M Warner. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.” NBER, Dec. 1995, 
(pg. 835) 
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                                 Figure 1: Growth and natural abundance 1970-1989 
 
 
 
Just as the curse dictates, countries with a lower amount of exported natural resources 
had higher rates of real GDP growth. The country of Zambia appears to be a geographical 
outlier as it lies in the same group as the wealthy oil exporting nations: Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, and United Arab Emirates. Zambia clearly fits the trend line in Sachs relationship 
and would appear to be a victim of the curse. 
It would be fair to assume that a country like Zambia would clearly reflect symptoms 
of the Dutch Disease. Instead of natural gas, however, the commodity in Zambia’s case is 
copper. Copper makes up roughly 80% of Zambia’s export earnings, and it is responsible for 
most of the economic activity in the country. In Figure 2 the data visualization from The 
Observatory of Economic Complexity is illustrated: 5
                                                      
5 “Zambia: Exports.” OEC: The Observatory of Economic Complexity, Collective Learning, Oct. 2018 
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                                                         Figure 2: Zambia, Exports 
 
 
 
If the Resource Curse holds, evidence of the disease should be rampant in the 
Zambian economy. In 2007, researchers Massimiliano Calì and Dirk Willem te Velde from 
the Overseas Development Institute investigate the empirical validity of the claim; the result: 
the Dutch Disease is empirically weak in the Zambian economy. While an increase in copper 
exports has naturally had an effect on the currency appreciation, they were unable to 
determine that the appreciation had “not caused a reduction in most NTE’s (non-traditional 
goods exports’), as would be predicted if Zambia suffered from the Resource Curse.” 6 The 
Dutch Disease, the driving assumption of the Resource Curse, appears to be dormant in the 
Zambian economy. 
Development economist Audira Kay Caine expresses a similar sentiment, in her 
thesis, “The Resource Curse: The Cases of Zambia and Botswana.” 7 A nation similar to 
Zambia in many demographic respects, Botswana has not faced the same adversity as its 
Zambian neighbor and is generally considered to be a country that has escaped the resource 
curse. A glimpse at annual GDP growth in Figure 3 illustrates this case. 8
                                                      
6 Cali, Massimiliano, and Dirk Willem Te Velde. “Is Zambia Contracting the Dutch Disease?” Overseas Development 
Institute, Feb. 2007. (pg. 1) 
7 Crain, Audria Kay, " The Resource Curse: The Cases of Botswana and Zambia" (2010). Electronic Theses 
and Dissertations. 
8 “Countries and Economies.” Countries | Data, World Bank. October, 2018 
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Figure 3: GDP growth (%) Zambia Vs. Botswana 
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Sachs mentions Botswana in his concluding remarks, attributing the direct 
contribution of the resource “which caused much of the rapid growth in Botswana.” 9 Data 
from the world bank highlights that Botswana grew annual around 10%, while Zambia grew 
roughly 1% to 2% per year.10 
Caine is in agreement with Cali and te Velde: “surprisingly, evidence that Zambia has 
suffered from the Dutch Disease is inconclusive.” 11 If Zambia was afflicted by the Dutch 
Disease then it would be most apparent in the years after Zambia gained independence as this 
was the time period when copper prices were the highest. An appreciating currency due to 
rising commodity priced should signal a declining manufacturing sector. This was not the 
case in Zambia, however, as “the manufacturing sector actually grew during the immediate 
 
                                                      
9 Sachs, Jeffrey D, and Andrew M Warner. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.” 
 NBER, Dec. 1995, (pg. 837) 
10 Note that the Zambian GDP has recently surpassed that of Botswana. 
11 Crain, Audria Kay, " The Resource Curse: The Cases of Botswana and Zambia" (2010).  
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. (pg. 5) 
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 post-independence period, and has experienced periods of growth and stagnation since.” 
12
 
The Dutch Disease, a driving mechanism of the Resource Curse, does not have a significant 
presence in the Zambian economy. Copper, on the other hand, does experience a significant 
amount of volatility.   
 
The Metal of Choice 
 
If Botswana is blessed with diamonds, then Zambia should be cursed with copper. 
 
Diamond prices have historically been stable due to the monopolistic nature of the market. In 
South Africa, the De Beers company owns over 90% of the mines and controls the supply to 
artificially keep the price of diamonds high. It was and remains a custom in American culture 
to propose with a diamond ring. In an effort to keep romance in the air, De Beers kept the 
price of diamonds high and stable by limiting supply. 
This characteristic of the diamond market was incredibly helpful for the economy of 
Botswana. The government in Botswana could rely on the price stability of diamonds when 
formulating policy, a luxury never afforded to the Zambian government. It would be 
counterintuitive to argue that diamonds are the sole reason for Botswana’s success. This 
appears to be an argument on the other side of Sach’s coin, a resource ‘blessing’ of sorts. 
Botswana’s success is attributed towards a number of other factors besides the existence of 
diamonds. Regardless, it is fair to observe that stability in diamond prices was an institutional 
feature of Botswana’s development. 
Copper, conversely, doesn’t sparkle the same way diamonds do. Whereas diamonds 
are subject to price stability, copper is problematic precisely due to its price volatility. The 
value of copper derives from its ability to conduct electricity, an essential component in 
developing infrastructure. It is used in just about everything: wires, pipes, construction 
projects, and heating. Copper is often cited as an indicator of economic growth, as investors
                                                      
12 Crain, Audria Kay, " The Resource Curse: The Cases of Botswana and Zambia" (2010). Electronic 
Theses and Dissertations. (pg. 5) 
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 can look towards copper to anticipate the direction of the market. As Wray points out, 
“copper use and price has been a very good predictor of recession, because copper feeds 
directly into residential construction, which itself is very pro-cyclical.” 13 Furthermore, the 
De Beers-type monopoly doesn’t apply; copper is mined around the world. As a result, 
copper incurs more price instability, further accentuated by speculators in the commodities 
market. 
Copper is a speculative metal. By counting the number of derivative contracts 
purchased on a given commodity, one can demarcate the degree of speculation. Copper is 
traded on the London Metal Exchange (LME), which provide reports summarizing the last 
month of trading. Derivatives are an indicator of speculation because they attempt to 
anticipate the movements in price. If an investor purchases a futures contract for copper, they 
are expecting the price to increase in the future. While aluminum takes the lead, the figure 
below indicates that copper is clearly a speculator’s metal of choice. 
                                                      
13 Wray, L Randall. “The Commodities Market Bubble.” The Levy Economics Institute of Bard, 2008. (pg. 16) 
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 Figure 4 
 
 
The amount of “open interest” on a commodity is another indicator of speculative 
activities. Wray argues open interest is a “useful way of assessing the impact of index 
speculation on commodity markets,” and defines open interest as “a measure of the dollar 
value of positions in commodity futures contracts.” 14 If the open interest is high, this 
indicates that investors are “interested” in purchasing that commodity and as a result, 
additional capital enters the market. Data from the LME reveals that copper attracts the 
second highest amount of open interest in the futures market (copper: 426,664, aluminium: 
852,442). 
Trading activity on the LME demonstrates copper is the metal of choice in futures 
markets. “Spot and Future Prices: The Speculative Link”, highlights the importance of the 
                                                      
14 Wray, L Randall. “The Commodities Market Bubble.” The Levy Economics Institute of Bard, 2008. (pg. 16) 
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 3-month futures contract in determining the price of copper. 15 It is the futures price of copper 
that determines the spot price of copper when the market is in contango, where futures price, 
not the spot price, that is the primary form of price discovery. 16 As Keynes put it in The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, “…speculators may do no harm as 
bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes 
the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.” 17 Zambian copper prices reflect market 
anticipations, as opposed to the fundamentals of supply and demand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
15 “Spot and Future Prices: The Speculative Link.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics Vol. 6, No. 3 
 (Spring, 1984), Pp. 433-448, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 
16 When the market is in contago it is bullish, as the futures price is above the spot price. 
17 Keynes, John M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan and Co.,  
Limited, 1936. Print. 
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 Evidence in Support of the Resource Curse 
 
The IMF provided context support to the resource curse in Zambia, by evidencing the 
impact of copper on the exchange rate. With regard to the commodities market, the IMF in a 
brief entitled “Keynes, Cocoa, and Copper: In Search of Commodity Currencies” 
demonstrated how commodity price movements influence the real exchange rate. 18 Zambia 
was one of the 58 commodity dependent countries examined from 1980-2002. Findings by 
the IMF reinforce the caricature of the Resource Curse in Zambia. 
Figure 5 
Real Exchange Rate and Real Commodity Price, 
Commodity Exporting Countries, 1980-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
18 Cashin, Paul, and Ratna Sahin. “Keynes, Cocoa, and Copper: In Search of Commodity Currencies.”  
IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, Dec. 2002 
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Furthermore, copper prices explicitly affect industry revenue. While the IMF kept 
Zambia in its periphery, Chukwuma F. Obidegwu brings Zambia into the fore with his work 
presented in his thesis written at the University of Pennsylvania. 19 Data from the 1960s 
provided by Obidegwu illustrates how closely the mineral and government revenue followed 
the price of copper. In 1974, Zambia nationalized its mining industry. As demonstrated by 
Figure 6, this was also the year the commodity bubble burst and the price of copper 
plummeted.20 
                                           Figure 6: Indices of LME Copper Prices 
                                           Government Total and Mineral Revenues 
 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
19 Obidegwu, Chukwuma F., and Mudziviri Nziramasanga. Copper and Zambia: An Econometric Analysis.  
Lexington Books, 1981. 
20 Figure 6 is a recreation of Obidegwu’s data  
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 Resource Curse Literature  
Resource cure literature continues to induce pessimistic conclusions. In 2011, Stephen 
Haber and Viktor Menaldo designed tests to examine a “long-run relationship between resource 
reliance and regime type within countries over time.” 21 Of the 18 countries initially tested, 
none evidenced a significant correlation. By relaxing the parameters of their model multiple 
times, however, they were – ironically – able to identify a single case of the resource curse: 
Zambia. As Haber and Menaldo state in their concluding remarks, “We can make a reasonable 
case for a resource curse in Zambia, but it is only one country out of 18 - and even in this case 
we are not fully confident that this is a reliable conclusion to draw.” 22 
In the same year Jonathan Di John examined the curse and asked, “Is There Really a 
Resource Curse: A Critical Survey of Theory and Evidence.” 23 Di John considers, among 
others, the case of Zambia which has experienced one of the worst declines in income per 
capita in the period 1960-2000. The reasons for Zambia’s poor economic performance are 
complex, but “include a disruption of regional trading routes, the nationalization of the 
copper industry before development of skilled workers emerged on the domestic scenes, and 
the mismanagement of the state-owned copper industry.” 24 Contrary to Sachs’ view of 
development, Di John highlights reasons related to the political economy, he concludes, “the 
extent to which mineral and fuel abundance generate developmental outcomes depends 
largely on the nature of the state and politics as well as the structure of ownership in the 
export sector, all of which are neglected in much of the resource curse literature.” 25 
Caine recognizes the value of metals to both the economy of Botswana and Zambia, 
yet comments on how the “economic resources curse explains only part of Zambia’s 
                                                      
21 Haber, Stephen, and Victor Menaldo. “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?  
A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse.” American Political Science Review, Feb. 2011. 
22 Ibid (pg. 50) 
23 Di John, Jonathan. “Is There Really a Resource Curse? A Critical Survey of Theory and Evidence.”  
Global Governance, Vol. 17, No. 2, The Governance of Extractive Resources. 
24 Ibid,. (pg. 177) 
25 Ibid (pg. 80) 
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failure to escape the resource curse: the political hypothesis provides the greater part of 
the explanation.” 26 Caine reiterates the idea that the resources are not to blame. 
Rather, the nature of the State and the direction of policy plays the lead role in determining 
whether a nation is cursed or blessed. Zambia should clearly exhibit characteristics of the 
Resource Curse. As demonstrated by the literature, however, existence of the curse in Zambia 
remains inconclusive at best. Contextualizing the Resource Curse ideologically illustrates 
why it is problematic.  
The Dragon of Backwardness 
While Sachs was writing during the 1990s, the field of development economics was 
dominated by neoclassical economics. Evidence of this is shown by Sachs’ writing, as he 
explains “most current explanations of the curse have a crowding out logic.” 27 Crowding out 
occurs when government spending inflates financial markets because the public sector, in 
theory competes with the private sector for scarce access to financing of capital assets. 
Sachs further addresses crowding out in a footnote in which he elaborates on the 
logical assumptions of his model. Sachs attempts to measure the influence of geography by 
offering a “third possible solution to calculate natural resources per-capita so that GDP is not 
in the denominator.” 28 Sachs finds this to not be a “good solution”, however, because he 
wants to measure the importance of natural resources in the economy, not just per capita. 
Sachs juxtaposes Canada and Zambia in order to illustrate that “Natural resources have much
26 Crain, Audria Kay, " The Resource Curse: The Cases of Botswana and Zambia" (2010).  
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. (pg 20) 
27 Sachs, Jeffrey D, and Andrew M Warner. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.”  
NBER, Dec. 1995. (pg. 833) 
28 Ibid, (pg. 830) 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 more potential to crowd out other economic activities in Zambia than in Canada. To test 
crowding-out theories, the better measure is percent of GDP.” 29 
Sachs’ footnote demonstrates the supply sided nature of his argument. Canada and 
Zambia are obviously two very different nations with dissimilar geographical locations and 
institutions. This example, however, isn’t enough to paint Sachs as ostensibly neoclassical. 
Kregel pins down the distinction by describing this type of supply-side approach as a “blend 
the neoclassical theory of distribution and the newly emerging theories of long-run economic 
growth.” 30 Sachs’ writing reflects the state of development economics at the time and further 
solidifies the Resource Curse as a by-product of this era. 
During the time of his writing, Sachs had been witnessing the poor performance of the 
developing world for the past twenty years. He observes, “almost without exception, the 
resource-abundant countries have stagnated in economic growth since the early 1970s, 
inspiring the term, `curse of natural resources.” 31 Hirschman would describe Sachs as one of 
the economists who expected the developing nations to act like wind-up toys, “lumber[ing] 
through the various stages of development single-mindedly.” 32 Within the neoclassical 
framework, the resources were the only suspect available to Sachs. Thus, Sachs was forced to 
conjure the supernatural and blame it on the wrong culprit: the resources.
                                                      
29 Sachs, Jeffrey D, and Andrew M Warner. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.”  
NBER, Dec. 1995. (pg. 830)  
30 Kregel, Jan A. “The Effective Demand Approach to Economic Development.”  
Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development. (pg. 11) 
31 Sachs, Jeffrey D, and Andrew M Warner. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.”  
NBER, Dec. 1995, (pg 837) 
32 Hirschman, Albert O. “The Rise and Decline of Development Economics.”  
Princeton University Press, 2013 (pg. 70) 
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 Conclusion 
As the resource curse literature reveals, the analytical focus should be directed toward 
government policy and the nature of the State, at the very least in the hopes of being 
proactive and pragmatic. Examining the ideological roots of the Resource Curse directs our 
attention towards the demand side approach towards development. In order to evaluate the 
demand side, a thorough understanding of Zambia’s colonial history is required in order to 
explain existing institutional aspects of the government. The next chapter will focus on these 
core issues.   
17
 Chapter II: Zambia and Neoliberalism 
 
While development economics was born after World War II, history indicates the 
management of production by the government as key for a developing nation to grow. Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations was commonly considered to be one of the first “how to” manuals 
for economic growth. 1 Smith was writing when the royal family largely controlled the 
market, which is why he emphasized the importance of free markets. Smith also emphasized, 
however, the importance of the organization of production in the economy as the means by 
which a nation can achieve technical progress. This element of Smith’s work is often eclipsed 
by his defence of the free market. Fortunately, the “how to” manual has been updated, and 
there are proven techniques that exist for developing nations. 
The organization of production was essential towards the growth of the modern 
powerhouse economies of Britain and the United States. Britain and the United States 
implemented strong tariffs and intellectual property rights while their economies were young 
in order to protect their economies and allow industries to become globally competitive. It 
wasn’t only these two nations, however, as Ha-Joon Chang explains “virtually all of today’s 
developed countries…actively used interventionist trade and industrial policies aimed at 
promoting, not simply “protecting,” it should be emphasized, infant industries during their 
catch-up periods.” 2 
The same story applies to the “East Asian Miracle”, as the World Bank termed it, 
which witnessed tremendous growth in Eastern Asia, as a result of state-led protectionist 
policies. 3 The reason for this success is far from mystical, however, as we begin to see the 
strong track record of state-led organization of production. East Asian economies experienced 
rapid growth during the 1950s and 1960s largely due to “intensive government intervention in 
                                                      
1 Kregel, Jan. Two Views on the Obstacles to Development. The New School, 2004. 
2 Chang, Ha-Joon. “Kicking Away the Ladder.” Foreign Policy in Focus, Dec. 2013. (pg. 3) 
3 Note that when the World Bank isn’t responsible for growth economics enters the supernatural; events can 
only be explained by miracles or curses. 
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 markets, including high rates of effective protection…and active technology-upgrading 
policies.” 4 Past examples provide evidence that updates the “how to” manual, revealing the 
miracle of government intervention. 
 
 
Shape Up 
 
State-led growth tactics worked well for Western development: it was only natural 
that the same approach would be taken towards African nations. At first, this interventionist 
policy was blatantly apparent as colonial powers saw no reason to hide their agenda. 
However, the State historically provides for its own interest and not the interests of the 
colonized State. The general objective of the British in Southern Africa was simply to “open 
up foreign markets for British products; to provide entrepreneurs with access to cheap 
sources of land, labor, and capital, and to secure the imports of raw materials demanded by 
the British.” 5 As time went by, however, the extractive mindset of the West became ever 
more discrete as the invisible hand began to ‘pick-pocket’ African states. 
While the scramble for Africa sounds like a hasty and quick endeavor, it was, in fact, 
a calculated and controlled effort that continues to impact development to this day. The West 
determined that the most effective way to share the wealth in Africa was to create their own 
borders that would distinguish nations by their respective colonizers. In 1885, Otto Van 
Bismark invited leaders to the Berlin Conference in order to draw the borders of African 
states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
4 Robert H. Wade, "How can Middle-Income Countries Escape ‘Gravity’ and Catch up with High-Income 
Countries? The Case for Open Economy Industrial Policy", Halduskultuur, 2008, vol 9, (pg. 6) 
5 Frankema, Ewout. “The Colonial Roots of Land Inequality: Geography, Factor Endowments, or 
Institutions?” The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 63, No. 2, Pp. 418-451, May 2010. (pg. 
433) 
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                                     Figure 1: “Ethnic Homelands and National Borders” 
 
 
Figure 1 highlights how colonial nation forming has handicapped Africa since the 
beginning, as the creation of borders cut and disrupted circulation of exchange in already 
cohesive groups. 6 Narrowing the focus to Southern Africa, one can see the split between 
Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as “many of the newly created African states 
had boundaries that cut across existing cohesive social or tribal groups, or encompassed a 
number of such groups.  
 
 
                                                      
6 Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. 2016. "The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for 
Africa." American Economic Review, 106(7): 1802-48. 
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 Death and Taxes 
 
Interest in Zambia initially came from the missionaries. The writing of David 
Livingstone, who claimed to have found the source of the Nile, attracted much of the 
European attention. Shortly thereafter came the traders and explorers, who were less 
interested in the Nile and more interested in the metals. During the 1890’s, Cecil Rhodes, 
along with the British South Africa Company (BSAC) had been exploring the region and was 
securing mineral prospecting rights from local chiefs. This mining excursion was “perhaps 
unparalleled in size and scope at the time”, and Rhodes and the South Africans knew the 
immense depth of copper reserves available in Zambia.7 The copper was there: the hard part 
was getting it out of the ground. 
In order to extract as much as possible, the colonial authority relied on the 
management of production to do so. This state-led approach manifested itself in Zambia 
through the control of labor. While border creation simply requires a ruler and pen, 
controlling human lives proves a difficult task. Before the mineral reserves were discovered, 
Zambia consisted mostly of subsistence farmers who would occasionally generate enough 
surplus to produce cash crops. As a result, there was no need to move away from home and 
engage in the dangerous work of mining. 
In order to control wage labor, the colonial authority had to monetize the economy. 
This was done through the implementation of a direct tax. In an attempt to reach the most 
workers, a “hut tax of three shilling was replaced in 1914 by a poll tax of five shillings per 
adult male, and five more for each wife beyond the first one.” 8 If the tax was not paid 
“punitive expeditions were mounted.” 9 This compelled Zambian workers, mostly men, to
                                                      
7 Frederiksen, Thomas. “Seeing the Copperbelt: Science, Mining and Colonial Power in Northern 
Rhodesia.” Geoforum, Pergamon, 7 Nov. 2012. (pg. 9) 
8 Beveridge, Andrew A., and Anthony R. Oberschall. African Businessmen and Development in Zambia. 
Princeton University Press, 1979. (pg. 23) 
9 Ibid 
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work in the mines as this was where the currency necessary for the tax could be obtained. 
This shifted the demographics of Zambia, as farmers became wage earners and urbanization 
began in the Copperbelt Region. 
The implementation of the direct tax reveals the increasing presence of discrete 
control. The colonizers were well aware of the “secret of colonial capitalist primitive 
accumulation, although they often justified the taxation on other grounds, some ideological 
and others demonstrating the multiple purposes of taxation from the colonial point of 
view.”10 Direct taxation was justified by colonial rulers as an assisting in tribal evolution, 
acting as a moral benefit to the Zambian workers. 
In practice, the tax benefitted colonial interests. By monetizing the economy, the 
British created a workforce that would be productive in the mines and buy European goods. 
By requiring the tax to be paid in the local colonial currency, the British created a workforce 
that not only served to extract minerals from the mines, it also “created markets for the sale 
of European goods”, enhancing the European capital markets with copper and cash. 11 
(In)dependence 
The power dynamic shifted after Zambia gained independence, as the 
implementation of policy was now in the hands of the Zambian government. While the West 
lost grip, it continued to exert discrete control over Zambian affairs. Attempts made by the 
Zambian government to manage their production were largely foiled by lack of support from 
Western institutions. The most important obstacle in the catch-up process is the “lack of 
managerial organization and decision making to produce technical progress.” 12 Lack  of 
10 Forstater, Matthew. Taxation and Primitive Accumulation: The Case of Colonial Africa. Research in 
Political Economy, 2005, Volume 22, (pg. 59) 
11 Ibid (pg 60) 
12 Kregel, Jan. Two Views on the Obstacles to Development. The New School, 2004. (pg. 2014) 
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 Zambian agency is demonstrated by the failed attempt at creating the International Council of 
Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC). 
Zambia gained independence in 1964, electing Kenneth Kaunda as the first president. 
Copper prices had been increasing since the first mines were opened in 1929 and, as a result 
of increasing prices since then, expectations for the future of Zambia were high. Figure 2 
illustrates the developments in Zambia along with the price of copper. 13 
 
                        Figure 2: Timeline of Zambia’s History with Copper Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
The hopes were premised on the same objective that powered the independence 
movement: “redistributing revenues from the copper exports to make a prosperous, non-racial 
society.” 14 Simultaneously, Zambia was classified as a middle-income country with one of 
the highest GDP’s in Africa, “three times that of Kenya, twice that of Egypt, and higher than 
Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey and South Korea.” 15 
                                                      
13 Fraser, Alastair, and Miles Larmer. “Zambia, Mining, and Neoliberalism.” Boom and Bust on the 
Globalized Copperbelt, Palgrave Macmillan US (pg. 2) 
14 Ibid (pg. 6) 
15 Ibid  
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 Despite these promising aspects, Kaunda and the Zambian government recognized that 
Zambia was a price-taker. In anticipation of volatile prices, Kaunda’s first attempt at 
managing the organization of production came with CIPEC. The goal of CIPEC was to join 
forces with other copper rich nations with the intention of controlling copper production. The 
initial four members of CIPEC, Zambia, Congo/Zaire, Chile, and Peru, were responsible for 
80 per cent of the world copper exports. 16 It was difficult to collectively agree upon a policy, 
yet the recent success of OPEC provided optimism for the project. If production could be 
controlled, price volatility would no longer be an issue for future Zambian development. 
While the theory of CIPEC was promising, it was nearly impossible to put into 
practice for a number of reasons. It was difficult to collective agree upon a policy as the 
newly independent nations lacked organizational abilities. Documents from the CIPEC 
archives shows the preoccupation with administrative problems and studies.” 17 Members of 
the cartel found it difficult to agree upon one strategy as they were preoccupied with their 
own respective stages of development and nationalization. 
The coup de grace for CIPEC came with the fall of the commodities market in the 
mid 1970s. As copper prices began to fall in 1974, members of CIPEC were unable to 
coordinate a pricing/production policy. The primary cause of the crash was found in the 
changing economic conditions, “particularly in Western industrialized states.” 18 The crash 
was largely “human made, as the commodities merely represent the latest asset class 
identified by money manager capitalism as ripe for financialization.” 19 Speculation in the 
commodities markets of the West, along with falling demand as Western economies 
                                                      
16 Mingst, Karen A. “Cooperation or Illusion: An Examination of the Intergovernmental Council of 
Copper Exporting Countries.” International Organization, Cambridge University Press, May 1976.  
(pg. 266) 
17 Ibid (pg. 275) 
18 Ibid (pg 285) 
19 Wray, L. Randall. The Commodities Market Bubble: Money Manager Capitalism and the 
Financialization of Commodities. The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 2008. 
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 decreased industrial activity after the war, all influencing the crash of copper prices in 1974. 
CIPEC evolved into an information exchange, not a price-bloc. 
The case of CIPEC demonstrates how Zambia was unable to manage the production 
of its economy. Organization of production is unquestioned in the development of Western 
economies, yet was rejected by Western institutions when Zambia tried to follow en route. 
The Western institutions remained uncharacteristically silent when CIPEC was gaining 
traction, as “the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development have refused financial assistance to CIPEC to finance stockpiles.” 20 
Members of CIPEC were not powerful enough to garner support from the West, as “rich 
countries [were] unwilling to support a project designed to reduce dependence.” 21 This 
speaks to the increased form of discrete control the West maintained in the Zambian 
economy, and provides a clear visualization of ‘kicking away the ladder’. 
 
 
The Curse of the Washington Consensus 
 
The Washington Consensus recommends market liberalization, foreign borrowing, 
deregulation, and privatization. Evidence of its effectiveness has yet to be discovered as 
developing nations have failed to thrive under said condition. The Washington Consensus 
approach was adopted by most of Latin American nations during the late 1970s, resulting 
in “increased poverty, stagnant or falling wages, and a further and steady widening of the 
distribution of income in virtually every nation has become the omnipresent and largely 
ignored social context of the neoliberal era.” 22
                                                      
20 Fraser, Alastair, and Miles Larmer. “Zambia, Mining, and Neoliberalism.” Boom and Bust on the 
Globalized Copperbelt, Palgrave Macmillan US (pg. 7) 
21 Ibid 
22 James M. Cypher, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 25, No. 6. (Nov., 1998), (pg. 47) 
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The Washington Consensus became the dominant play book for the World Bank/IMF 
because it was a product of the neoclassical ideology. 23 The neoclassical paradigm was born 
in response to the Keynesian economics of the World War II era. In the 1970s, a number of 
economists pushed back against Keynes’ ideas. In 1979 Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent 
published “After Keynesian Economics”, in which they declared Keynes’ government 
spending plan predictions as “wildly incorrect and that the doctrine on which they were 
based is fundamentally flawed.” 24 Neoclassical economics dominated the scene for the next 
thirty years. Figure 3 illustrates the drop in the growth rates associated with the neoliberal 
period post 1970s. 25 
Figure 3: GDP Growth (Annual %) World 
23 The same way the Resource Curse was grounded in neoclassical thinking.   
24 Lucas, Robert E. After Keynesian Economics: A Cloudy Future for Minnesota's Business. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Apr. 1979. (pg. 28) 
25 GDP Growth (Annual %) All Economies and Countries | Data, World Bank. October, 2018 
26
 Kaunda’s Keynesian Economics 
 
Kaunda’s government claimed a 51% ownership stake of all mines and combined 
two of the largest mines into Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). ZCCM was one 
of the largest mines that was eventually privatized in the late 1990s. It bears much 
significance as ZCCM came to reflect the “states development philosophy” because it 
provided “subsidized housing and food, free education for miner’s children, electricity, 
water, and transport in the townships” in response to union demands. 26 This was referred to 
as a cradle-to-grave welfare system, as it provided a lifetime of subsidies.  
The Zambian government now controlled roughly 80% of the economy and made 
every effort to manage the organization of production. 27 Unfortunately, 1974 marks the 
beginning of the commodities crash as copper prices began to plummet over the next thirty 
years. Throughout this crisis, ZCCM was treated as a “cash-cow” as it was “milked without 
corresponding investment in machinery and prospecting ventures.  Production collapsed in 
line with the falling copper prices and by the 1990s Zambia was the 25th poorest country in 
the world. 28
                                                      
26 Fraser, Alastair, and Miles Larmer. “Zambia, Mining, and Neoliberalism.” Boom and Bust on the 
Globalized Copperbelt, Palgrave Macmillan US (pg. 9) 
27 Grievechelwa. “Lessons from Kaundanomics.” Developing Economics, 28 Apr. 2017. 
28 Fraser, Alastair, and Miles Larmer. “Zambia, Mining, and Neoliberalism.” Boom and Bust on the 
Globalized Copperbelt, Palgrave Macmillan US (pg. 9) 
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The government’s control over the economy became increasingly limited as Zambia 
needed loans from the World Bank/IMF to meet existing debt contracts let alone generate 
investment and provide welfare. Control by the West was now indiscrete, as Zambia was 
forced to adopt the Structural Adjustment Programs that were imposed by the World Bank. 
The SAP’s forced the privatization of the mining industry, marked by the selling of ZCCM to 
foreign companies in the late 1990s. 
 
 
From the Cradle to the Grave 
 
The privatization of the Zambian mining industry indicates the extractive history of 
the West. This mind-set, mixed with a healthy dose of neoclassical assumptions, came 
together to form the Washington Consensus, taking Zambia from the cradle to the grave. 
Kaunda had protected the Zambian economy, just as the developed nations had done when 
they were growing, from the forces of globalization. The Zambian State, however, lacked the 
institutional support to exercise its own policies and defend itself from the fallacy of the free 
market. As a result, much of the copper was extracted from Zambia to enhance the capital 
markets of the West.  
Zambia has been subject to discrete forms of control before it gained independence. 
This is chronologically demonstrated through the creation of borders, enforcement of direct 
taxes, and implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programs. The means of control 
came through aid, as it had been “withheld at decisive moments to weaken the bargaining 
28
 power of the Zambian state, to undermine the legal right of civil society organizations to 
influence the privatization process, and to enable new investors to flout their social 
obligations.” 29 
This was possible because development economics was never considered its own field 
of study. The flawed growth models from the Reagan/Thatcher era were taken and applied 
towards the development world. The one-size-fits-all policy recommendations coming from 
Washington was irresponsibly applied to developing nations. These policies conveniently 
enhanced the capital markets of the West. This is apparent with copper, as copper speculation 
was responsible for much of the financialization of the commodities market. 30 
In fact, correct growth policies will allow developing nations to grow faster, as they did in 
the 1960s and 1970s, as it will “increase the trade and investment opportunities available to 
the developed countries in the developing countries.” 31 
Evidence of the crumbling consensus is growing as previous members of the 
Washington Consensus club are recognizing the error of their ways. George Stiglitz, 
previously the chief economist at the World Bank, has insisted that “much of neoliberal 
economics is nothing but ideology masquerading as defensible, even irreproachable, 
economic science.” 32 Three economists from the IMF, Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash 
Loungani, and Davide Furceri in an article entitled Neoliberalism: Oversold?, advocate for a 
more “nuanced view of what the neoliberal agenda is likely to able to achieve.” 33 The article 
states the neoliberal agenda is limited, and policy makers must “not be guided by faith, but 
by evidence of what has worked.” 34 
                                                      
29 Larmer, Miles. “Reaction & Resistance to Neo-Liberalism in Zambia.” ROAPE Publications, Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 103, Imperialism & African Social Formations, Mar. 2005. 
30 Portfolios were growing while Zambia’s wealth was shrinking. 
31 Chang, Ha-Joon. “Kicking Away the Ladder.” Foreign Policy in Focus , Dec. 2013. (pg. 14) 
32 Cypher, James M. “The Slow Death of the Washington Consensus on Latin America.” Latin American 
Perspectives, vol. 25, no. 6, 1998, (pg. 51) 
33 Ostry, Jonathan D, et al. “Neoliberalism: Oversold?” Finance and Development , 2016. IMF 
34 Ibid 
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The next chapter describes the methodology of creating a Social Accounting Matrix 
for the Zambian economy. This takes the focus from the supply side to the demand side, as 
the SAM illustrates the effect government policy interventions have on the economy.  
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Chapter III: The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
History of the Social Accounting Matrix 
Sir Richard Stone is credited with formulating a modern Social Accounting Matrix in 
the early 1940s. While the ancestry of the SAM can be traced back to the 1700s, an early 
version of a SAM was first used to accompany the research of Keynes in 1941. During the 
time of the Second World War, Keynes was “preparing a “White Paper” on British war 
finance.” 1 The work of Stone accompanied this paper and used a “double-entry bookkeeping 
method to national accounts” 2, which was new and incredibly useful at the time. This was 
particularly helpful for the British government during World War II, as it “offered a method 
of presenting detailed information about increasingly complex economies at a time when the 
growing interest in macroeconomics and counter-cyclical policies intensified the need for 
such knowledge.” 3 The model Stone created for Keynes in 1941, however, was referred to as 
a System of National Accounts and was not the polished SAM illustrated in Figure 1. Stone 
considered this SNA “limited in scope” 4, and revised the model to create the Social 
Accounting Matrix in 1968. 
SAMs are widely drawn upon in the field of development economics. While the 
concept was first created to assist Keynes with his war spending plan, it has since then 
evolved to address the needs and issues of developing countries. SAM’s have been created 
for a number of developing nations, as early as the 1970s for Sri Lanka, Botswana, Korea, 
and Indonesia. The aim of these studies is to examine the “nature of the multiplier effects of 
an income injection in one part of an economic system on the functional and institutional
1 Survey of Current Business, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Mar. 1992, fraser.stlouisfed.org. 
(pg. 27) 
2 Ibid (pg. 27) 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
31
distribution in general and on the incomes of socio-economic groups of households in 
particular.” 5
Overview of the Social Accounting Matrix 
A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is one of the best ways to have a snapshot view 
of an economy during a given time period. The method of organizing capital flows through a 
matrix allows one to better understand where money is flowing. The SAM depicted in Figure 
1 represents a simplified version of a SAM created for Zambia in 2007. 
5 Round, Jeffery. “Social Accounting Matrices and SAM-Based Multiplier Analysis.” Chapter 14. (pg. 2) 
Figure 1: SAM Visualization 
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In the case of Figure 1, only five sectors of the economy are illustrated: Agriculture, 
Mining, Government, Business Services, and Export Taxes. Each individual cell represents 
the transaction of the corresponding sectors. For example, the Mining row reveals where 
corresponding columns derive the expenditures. Where the Mining row meets the 
Government column illustrates the amount spent by the government in the mining sector. In 
the SAM, “each cell shows the payment from the account of its column to the account of its 
row – the incomes of an account appear along its row, its expenditures along its column.” 6 
The coefficients of a SAM are valuable tools indicating capital flows. For example, 
the Mining row’s coefficients determine what the Mining row’s distribution is, as 
demonstrated by the size of the circles in Figure 1. The larger the circle, the higher the 
coefficient. Hence, Figure 1 posits that the majority of the Mining Sectors’ income is 
transacted from the Mining and Business Services sectors. 7
A SAM tracks various sectors within the economy simultaneously, manifesting the 
circular flow of payments between different sectors in the economy, including goods, 
activities, factors, and institutions. Sectoral interactions are recorded in matrix form. This is 
clearly illustrated in a SAM created for the village of Nana Kotda in India: 
6 Chikuba, Zali, et al. 2007 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Zambia. Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis 
and Research, Lusaka, Zambia, Jan. 2013. (pg. 6) 
7 Keep in mind this is for illustrative purposes only, does not reflect real coefficients. 
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 Figure 2: SAM for Nana Kotda, India 
 
Figure 2 represents the interaction between endogenous and exogenous variables. 
“X34” demonstrates the interaction between an exogenous sector, the Government, with the 
incomes from an endogenous sector, Productive Activity. 8 When scenarios are run, the value 
in the SAM lies in the interactions between sectors in the economy. The same concept applies 
when the SAM is taken from the village in India to the national economy of Zambia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
8 “Appendix B. Technical Note on the Social Accounting Matrix.” Levy Institute, (pg. 2) 
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 Methodology 
 
Overview of Steps 
 
In 1995, the first SAM was created for Zambia. Since then, the SAM has been 
updated by the Zambian Institute for Policy and Research (ZIPAR) for the year 2007. One of 
the key features of a SAM is the flexibility it allows for, in that “there is a large measure of 
flexibility both in the degree of disaggregation and in the emphasis placed on different parts 
of the economic system (1).” 9 This flexibility allowed for the following six steps to be taken 
with the existing SAM created by ZIPAR: 
 
 
Step I: The existing SAM was aggregated to make it easier to use and allow for the 
disaggregation. 
Step II: Copper was disaggregated in order to isolate the effect copper in the Zambian 
economy. 
Step III: In order to distribute copper in the SAM, the coefficients of the Mining sector were 
calculated. The assumption is that the Copper row has the same coefficient as the Mining 
row. 
Step V: The tax on copper is effective if the copper exports are isolated from the rest of the 
Mining exports. Assumption: the copper exports are directly proportional to the rest of the 
Mining sector. 
Step VI: The tax on copper export was increased by 25%. Once the tax was collected, 60% 
went to the rural sector, 20% went to the Urban sector, and 20% went the Business Services 
sector. 
The following six steps describe this process in greater detail: 
 
                                                      
9 “Appendix B. Technical Note on the Social Accounting Matrix.” Levy Institute, (pg. 2) 
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I.) Aggregation 
The existing SAM was aggregated by combining all of the individual sectors into broader 
sectors. 10 These sectors were chosen because they all contribute towards mining activities: 
Sectors included in Mining aggregation 
- Forestry
- Mining
- Metals
- Machinery & Vehicles
- Transportation and Storage
- Other Manufacturing
- Construction
- Electricity
- Water
Additional notes regarding the aggregation: 
- In the existing SAM from ZIPAR, they distinguish between “activities” and
“commodities.” For the aggregations, the distinction was ignored and the sectors were
combined.
- Various sectors, such as the tax sectors, were not aggregated. If the tax sectors were
aggregated, the distinction between the export and import tax would be lost.
10 Figure 14 visualizes the entire SAM structure 
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 - The following sectors were created (bold indicates sectors that received aggregation): 
Agriculture, Mining, Commodities, Business Services, Government, Labor, 
Rural, Urban, Enterprise, Government Taxes, Direct Taxes, Export Taxes, Import 
Taxes, Import Taxes, Taxes Sales, Tax Value Added, s-i, Change in Stock, Rest of 
World. 
 
Figure 3: SAM Aggregation 
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 II.) Disaggregation of Copper 
 
Once the aggregated SAM was completed, the value generated by copper in 2007 was 
calculated: 
 
(Price of Copper $USD x Copper Production Metric Tonnes) x (Kwacha/USD exchange rate) = Copper Value 
 
 
 
($7131.53 USD x 560731.28 MT) x (3990.31) = 15.95 T Kwacha 
 
 
Figure 3 represents a simplified model of the aggregated SAM. Once copper was 
disaggregated, it was then included in the SAM (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Copper Disaggregation 
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 III.) Copper Distribution via Mining Sector Coefficients 
 
The existing coefficients factor an important role in the SAM. The coefficients reveal 
the distribution of capital within a given sector. In the Mining row, capital is distributed 
across the row depending on which sectors generates the most activity. In order to 
correctly distribute copper into the SAM, the same coefficients as the Mining sector were 
utilized. 
In order to do this, the coefficients for the Mining sector were calculated. This was 
done by adding all of the corresponding rows together, and calculating the distribution in 
that row. The amount of copper, 15.95 Trillion Kwacha, was then distributed into the 
SAM via the same coefficients as the Mining sector. The same coefficients were applied 
because copper was initially disaggregated from the Mining sector. This is the 
distribution of copper into the SAM.  
 
Figure 5: Copper Coefficients 
 
39
 IV.) Isolating Copper Exports 
 
Initially, the SAM only had a value for the amount of Kwacha earned from export taxes 
 
from the mining sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To pull out the copper exports: 
 
 
(copper value) ÷ (mining sector total) = copper tax percentage 
9658/88040 = 10.9% 
 
 
Hence, copper is responsible for roughly 11% of the 3.55 billion Kwacha. 
(3.55)(10.9%) = 0.39 
 
 
This value was then placed in the corresponding cell in the SAM: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: SAM Visualization 
Figure 7: SAM Visualization 
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 V.) Linking the Economy 
 
Figure 8 explains the method used to link the economy. If the tax rate on copper exports 
is increased by 25%, then K 97,342,242 is then distributed throughout the Rural, Urban, 
and Business Services sectors via the coefficient of their respective rows. A Multiplier of 
20% is assumed.   
 
 
Figure 8: SAM Linkage  
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Figure 10: Methodology Overview 
Figure 9: Results 
Step I Step II 
Step IV 
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Figure 13: Urban Distribution 
Figure 12: Business Services Distribution 
Figure 11: Rural Distribution 
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Figure 14 
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 Chapter IV: SAM Observations 
 
As previously discussed, Social Accounting Matrices offer the ability to discern first 
and second rounds effects of changes in policies. The SAM has the ability to track shocks to 
the economy, providing insight to policy makers. The SAM becomes helpful towards policy 
recommendations when the results are supported with theoretical evidence and the assumptions 
are thoroughly examined. Hence, the SAM illustrates the following four sundry observations 
on the nature of the Zambian economy: 
    1.) Agriculture and the Institution 
2.) Taxes and Revenue 
3.) Debt Fragility 
4.)  The Multiplier 
 
1.) Agriculture and the Institution 
 
As demonstrated by Figure 11 in the previous chapter, the agriculture sector is the most 
responsive when capital is directed towards the rural sector. If someone in the rural sector 
receives an additional Kwacha, they will most likely spend that extra dollar on purchasing food 
items from the agricultural sector. Agriculture has long been an important sector in Sub Saharan 
nations, as they have reflected the importance of institutions. 
Institutions matter, as the “differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause 
of differences in economic development.” 1 Institutions are vital to economic growth as they 
“influence investments in physical and human capital and technology, and the organization of
                                                      
1 Acemoglu, Daron, et al. “Institutions as Fundamental Cause of Long Run Growth.” Department of 
Economics, MIT, May 2004. (pg 386) 
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 production.” 2 In the SAM methodology, 60% was directed to the rural sector as institution 
determines the distribution of resources in the long run, or “how the pie is divided among 
different groups and individuals in society.” 3 
As a result, the decision to distribute if oftentimes political. Acemoglu references Bates: 
“Demonstrated that poor agricultural performance in Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia was due to 
government controlled marketing boards systematically paying farmers prices for their crops 
much below world levels.” 4 During the 1960s there was crash in the world price of cocoa, and 
the government placed the “burden on the drop in price to the producers.” 5 Instead of generating 
revenues to build up a rainy day fund for depressed prices during the 1960s crash, the revenues 
were redistributed in order to maintain power. The distribution of resources was political and not 
concerned with long term growth, thereby affecting the development of the nations that inherited 
this type of institution. 
In the case of Sub Saharan Africa, growth rates can be attributed towards the type of 
institution left behind by the colonial predecessors. In the case of agriculture, the difference 
between effective institutions was according to “who controlled the marketing board.” 6 Kenya, 
for example, inherited agricultural policy that was pro-farmer. The “British settlers expropriated 
the land from Africans during the expansion of colonialism.” 7 Thus, leaving the newly 
independent nation of Kenya with an institution that was favorable to farmers in the agricultural 
sector. The decisions regarding revenue distribution were not grounded in political necessity,
                                                      
2 Acemoglu, Daron, et al. “Institutions as Fundamental Cause of Long Run Growth.” Department of Economics, 
MIT, May 2004. (pg. 389) 
3 Ibid, (pg. 390) 
4 Ibid, (pg. 444) 
5 Ibid, (pg. 444) 
6 Ibid, (pg. 444) 
7 Ibid, (pg. 449) 
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 allowing Kenya to develop its economy. 
 
Further evidence of the importance of institutions is highlighted by the experience of East 
Asian countries. In this case, the focus is on the technology sector instead of the agriculture 
sector. In “China, India, Korea and Taiwan, the governments were involved in the smallest 
details, such as cherry-picking specific companies for subsidies.” 8 This method of growth 
“deviated from the free market ethos of the Washington Consensus”, yet turned out to be a 
hugely successful approach towards development. 9 When a nation is growing an infant 
economy, the “nationally owned firms have the greater incentive to take the lead, as they can 
afford to share more of the risk. 10 Amsden points out that nationalized industries “tend to foster 
an ethos of equality”, which is exemplified by the initiatives taken by Kenneth Kaunda in the 
development of the Copperbelt. 11Amsden attributes institution building as the most successful 
play by the East Asian governments, and critiques the Washington Consensus for its inability to 
connect theory and practice. 
Thus, the results from the SAM indicate the importance of gearing policy towards the 
agriculture sector. If emphasis is placed on directing revenue towards the rural sector, this will 
stimulate the economy, as increased disposable incomes in the rural sector could translate to a 
higher marginal propensity to consume goods in other sectors besides agriculture. This could 
promote complimentary industries, furthering capital development in the economy. 
 
                                                      
8 Amsden, Alice H. “Import Substitution in High-Tech Industries: Prebisch Lives in Asia.” CEPAL Review, MIT, 
Apr. 2004. (pg. 76) 
9 Ibid (pg. 76) 
10Ibid (pg. 77) 
11 Ibid (pg. 79), discussed in Chapter II 
47
 2.) Taxes for Revenue 
 
The SAM assumed the Zambian government would increase the tax rate on copper by 
25%. The decision emulated the tax program following the 2008 crash in the price of copper, 
where the Zambian government imposed a Windfall Tax of 25%. The following timeline gives an 
overview of the Zambian tax program. 
 
 
2008: The Zambian economy, like the rest of the world, was severely impacted by the global 
financial crisis. As the commodities market recovered, however, copper prices began to soar. In 
response to the huge gains mining companies were experiencing, the Zambian government 
imposed a Windfall Tax of 25%. The initiative was scrapped, however, as the industry feared the 
Windfall Tax would scare away investors. The initiative was “backed by the World Bank to help 
Zambia raise funds required to build schools, roads and provide health and education services 
in the southern African country.” 12 
 
 
2014: The Zambia government announced it was relaxing export tax regulation. According to 
Alexander Chikwanda, the Finance Minister, the government “had decided to relax the rule 
requiring copper mining companies to preset import certificates from destination countries as it 
has proved hard to implement, mainly because it involves documentation from importers outside 
the country's jurisdiction.” Again, we see the growing negative sentiment in response to mining 
industry. 13 
 
                                                      
12 Zambia Says Will Not Reintroduce Mine Windfall Tax.” Reuters, 25 Aug. 2009 
13 Bariyo, Nicholas. “Zambia Plans to Relax Tax Rules on Copper Exports.” The Wall Street Journal, 
Dow Jones & Company, 26 Aug. 2014. 
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 2016: Recently, the Zambian government has announced a new tax scheme that is based off of 
the price of copper. Depressed copper prices during 2016 caused the mining lobbyists to 
request the “price-based royalty structure”, which intends to encourage investment and 
production during a time when it is needed the most. When the price of copper is low, the tax 
rates are low, vice versa. 14 
Recently, Sub-Saharan nations have taken a stronger stance on mining companies by 
implementing harsher tax laws. Zambia recently imposed a $7.9 Billion tax assessment on First 
Quantum Minerals and indicated that it was “planning an audit on other miners in the country.” 
15 Part of the reason for these taxes is that mining companies have continually failed to deliver 
on their promises. Figure 1 reflects the impact in the stock price of these companies. 16 
                                                                                      Figure 1: “Bumpy Ride for African Miners”  
 
 
                                                      
14 “Zambia Approves Price-Based Royalties for Copper Mines.” Reuters, 17 Feb. 2016. 
15 Mordant, Nicole, and Chris Mfula. “Zambia Slaps Miner First Quantum with $8 Billion Tax Bill.” Reuters, 20 
Mar. 2018. 
16 Biesheuvel, Thomas, and Thomas Wilson. As Commodities Roar, Africa Wants Bigger Slice of Mining Pie. 
Bloomberg, 21 Mar. 2018. 
 
49
 Consider, however, if government spending was not determined by the amount of 
revenue it earned on copper exports. This proposition was made by Beardsly Ruml, the chairman 
(president) of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Ruml gave a speech as the second world 
war came to an end, in which he explained that “Taxes for Revenue are Obsolete.” 17 Ruml’s 
basis for making this claim was his examination of wartime spending, in which it became 
“apparent that nations have been able to pay their bills even though their tax revenue fell short 
of their spending.” 18 The purpose of taxes is not to raise revenue for government spending. 
This effectively challenges the rigid dogma of matching revenue to spending, allowing a 
relaxed budget deficit. This would allow the government to absorb the volatility of copper 
revenues by spending during times of crisis. Michael A. Nelson and Ram D. Singh found “there 
is little or no conclusive evidence that such deficits retard GDP growth rates.” 19 Their study 
examined the effect of deficit spending across 70 nations during the 1970s and 1980s, and they 
found that “indeed, some of the strongest performing (‘overachieving’) developing countries 
incurred large budget deficits over this period.” 20 While this study does paint a large brush over 
many different cases, there does not appear to be a negative association with deficit spending. 
As Nelson and Singh mention, a “myriad of studies has examined the empirical link 
between budget deficits and interest rates.” 21 While this was written in the late 1990s, recent 
studies have attempted to show the effect of budget deficits on the interest rate. Ikechukwu 
Kelikume, for example, looks at the effects of budget deficits on interest rates in Sub-Saharan 
Africa from 2000 to 2014. Kelikume finds that “the interest rate initially responded negatively to 
                                                      
17 Ruml, Beardsley. “Taxes for Revenue Are Obsolete.” American Affairs, Jan. 1946. 
18 Ibid, (pg. 35) 
19 Nelson, Michael A., and Ram D. Singh. “The Deficit-Growth Connection: Some Recent Evidence from 
Developing Countries.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 43, no. 1, 1994. (pg. 184) 
20 Ibid, (pg. 184) 
21 Ibid, (pg. 167) 
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budget deficit but subsequently becomes incentive or neutral to government budget deficit.” 
22
The effect of government budget deficits remains largely neutral towards the interest rate. 
The alternative approach that matches revenue with spending tends to result in increased 
instability. Chile, a nation similar to Zambia in that the lion’s share of its exports is copper, 
demonstrates why this is the case. In Chile, as Clark W. Reynolds highlights, “government 
expenditures moved in the same direction as copper revenues transmitting instability to the rest 
23
of the system, especially as revenues moved to the same direction as operating expenditures.” 
Reynolds advocates for a “conscious stabilization policy” in an attempt to “offset fluctuations in 
domestic income created by changes in operating expenditures of the export sector by running 
 a surplus during periods of increasing revenue and a deficit during declines (this would 
amount, in effect, to a "buffer fund" of copper revenues in the form of foreign exchange).” 24 
Fixing government spending to revenue leads to instability, especially when copper is a main 
export amidst copper price volatility. 
Reynolds concludes by claiming that “the relative destabilizing effect of government tax 
and expenditure policy in the export economy is likely to increase as one or more of the 
following factors increase: the export industry is increasingly foreign owned and government 
expenditure tends to equal government revenue.” 25 These are, ironically, two policy 
recommendations the World Bank has recommended for Zambia. Privatizing the mining industry 
leads to “the export industry” being “foreign owned.” The redistribution of the export tax is 
22 Kelikume, Ikechukwu. “The Effect of Budget Deficit on Interest Rates in the Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa: 
A Panel VAR Approach.” The Journal of Developing Areas, Tennessee State University College of Business, 
Apr. 2016. (pg. 118) 
23 W., Clark. “Domestic Consequences of Export Instability.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2, 
Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, May 1963. 
(pg. 97) 
24 Ibid, (pg. 98) 
25 Ibid, (pg. 102) 
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largely advocated for by the World Bank and the IMF. In 2011, the World Bank published What 
Would It Take for Zambia’s Copper Mining Industry to achieve its Potential? where they 
recommend Zambia can reduce dependency on extractive industries by “capturing through 
taxation a larger proportion of income from the mining industry and investing the revenues in 
infrastructure and public services.” 26  However, as Beardsly Ruml put it, “taxes for revenue are 
obsolete.” 
3.) Debt Fragility 
Sir Richard Stone was given credit for creating the SAM method, which “was widely 
recognized” during the 1960s. 27 Stone continued honing the craft into the 1980s, and 
“considered possible future developments, including improved linkage of social and 
demographic statistics to economic statistics.” 28 Since then, the method has been updated and is 
now referred to as a Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) modelling approach, which became 
increasingly popular “after the recent crisis of 2007-09.” 29 The popularity increased after the 
crisis, because the SFC approach “provides a natural way to examine issues related to financial 
fragility and its links to the real economy.” 30 The SAM provides a snapshot of the economy at
26 Report No. 62378-ZM. “What Would It Take for Zambia’s Copper Mining Industry to Achieve Its Potential?” 
The World Bank, Finance & Private Sector Development Unit, Africa Region, June 2011. (pg. 60) 
27 Survey of Current Business, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Mar. 1992, fraser.stlouisfed.org. (pg. 27) 
28 Ibid, (pg. 27) 
29 Nikiforos, Michalis, and Gennaro Zezza. “Stock-Flow Consistent Macroeconomic Models: A Survey.” Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard, Working Paper No. 891, May 2017. (pg. 2) 
30 Ibid, (pg. 5) 
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 one point in time, it is a stock. The SFC approach reveals the flow, the direction of where the 
money is coming from and where it is going. 
The conversation between the developed and underdeveloped worlds has led to the 
evolution of the national accounting methods. First, Keynes employed the method to advise the 
British government as to how it should best distribute capital during WWII. Next, the method of 
national accounting was used by developing economies, as this method provides newly 
independent governments with an overarching view of sectoral relationships present in the 
economy. Recently, the accounting method has been updated to identify financial fragility. The 
next step is naturally to apply the SFC approach towards development economics in an effort to 
identify systemic risk. This is certainly prevalent, as Figure 2 reveals how Sub Saharan Africa 
has accrued tremendous amounts of debt over the past twenty years. 31 
 
                              Figure 2: “External debt evolution in Sub-Saharan Africa” 
  
 
 
 
                                                      
31 Rapid Public Debt Build-up in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Credendo, 1 Mar. 2018 
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The SAM from 2007 suggests that the SFC approach has not been considered by the 
Zambian Institute for Policy and Research Centre (ZIPAR). In “the world of neoclassical 
models”, the models are “supply-side, full-employment models at heart.” 32 In the case of the 
SAM, the “introduction of (ad hoc) rigidities allows them to derive some Keynesian results in 
the short run as a special case. However, in the medium run, the economy always returns to full 
employment or to its natural rate of unemployment.” 33 If Sub Saharan nations, especially 
Zambia, adopted a SFC approach they would have an increased understanding of debt flows 
present in the economy. 
There has been debate over whether the government has been truthful regarding their 
reporting on national debt statistics. The concern is, that Zambia will end up “pulling a 
Mozambique.” 34 Mozambique defaulted on its debt in 2015 when it was revealed that they 
had $2 billion of hidden debt that had been spent on fishing and military ships. 35 As a result, 
international support became non-existent, plunging Mozambique into economic crisis. 
Investors are concerned Zambia may be in a similar situation, as Figure 3 signals how the 
yield on Zambia’s Eurobonds fell once the suggestion of hidden debt was mentioned by the 
government.36  
32 Nikiforos, Michalis, and Gennaro Zezza. “Stock-Flow Consistent Macroeconomic Models: A Survey.” Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard, Working Paper No. 891, May 2017. (pg. 46) 
33 Ibid, (pg. 46) 
34 Wallace, Paul, and Matthew Hill. “Zambia's Bonds Plummet on Concern It's Pulling a Mozambique.” 
Bloomberg, 10 Apr. 2018. 
35 To informally call it “pulling a Mozambique” illustrates the broad stroke economists, or reporters, paint 
over different African countries.
36 Wallace, Paul, and Matthew Hill. “Zambia's Bonds Plummet on Concern It's Pulling a Mozambique.” 
Bloomberg, 10 Apr. 2018. 
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               Figure 3: “Zambia’s Eurobonds yields are the highest in more than a year” 
 
 
If the Zambian government can update its accounting method it will be able to identify hidden 
debt. It is vital that the government is aware of where the debt is flowing in the Zambian 
economy.
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4.) The Multiplier 
 
The SAM assumes the multiplier exists in developing economies. The Keynesian 
Multiplier Theory was, however, originally designed to function in developed economies. This 
becomes clear by examining the four main assumptions of the KMT provided by V.K.R.V Rao.36 
The following points informally address the extent of which the assumptions of the Keynesian 
Multiplier hold in regard to developing countries. 
Developed Underdeveloped 
Involuntary 
Unemployment 
Disguised Unemployment 
- Rural sector is 58% of workforce, room for movement. 
- High responsiveness to the agricultural sector in the SAM 
Upwards Facing 
Supply Curve 
Non-responsive Supply Curve 
- Intuitional capacity is limited (public utilities, property 
rights, government suzerainty) 
 
Excess Capacity for 
Wage Goods 
Limited Excess Capacity 
- Zambian economy characterized by transitional capital 
development in the wage goods industries 
- Results from the Business Sector suggest capital is 
increasingly distributed to the Urban sector. 
 
Fluid Capital Markets Non-existent, ‘Steep’ 
- small underdeveloped centralized exchange 
-    Eurobond volatility  
-     multiple non-sovereign debt accumulation 
 
 
 
 
36 Rao, V.K.R.V. “Investment, Income and the Multiplier in an Underdeveloped Economy.” The Indian 
Economic Journal, vol. 56, no. 2, July 2008. 
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 Conclusion: The Zambian Consensus 
 In 2018 Mosi Lager, Zambia’s national beer, launched a rebranding campaign.1 The 
Lusaka Times reports, “despite the new look, the Mosi beer remains untouched and is the 
same premium quality lager brewed in Zambia since the early ‘70s.” 2 Mosi Lager 
representative Annabelle Degroot of Zambian Breweries explains “We rebranded the bottle, 
but it is only the bottle appearance that has changed. The content is and will always remain 
our thunderously refreshing premium lager.” 3 
 In the same year, Zambia Plus was announced, an economic program promising to 
return to a period of high growth, from 3 to 7%.4 Zambia Plus is similar to the rebranding 
undergone by Mosi. The beer in the bottle is the same, just as the policies recommended by 
Zambia Plus consists of the same market-friendly approach Zambia has taken since the 
1970s. Zambia Plus consists of five pillars, most of which are practical and important for the 
Zambian economy. The thesis of the initiative remains, however, market-friendly.  
 Free trade arguments are often counterintuitive to long term domestic capital 
development. Zambia was forced to privatize the mining industry after experiencing thirty 
years of falling copper prices. Privatization is great for generating production, but if 
production doesn’t benefit domestic policy, then who is producing for what? As Dudley 
Dillard would say, “Real goods appear to the individual producer as an artificial form of 
wealth until they are converted into money which appears as real wealth to the individual 
producer. For the community, however, goods are real wealth and money is artificial.” 5  
The recent history of development economics indicates the state-led approach towards 
development results in higher growth rates. This is further supported by low growth rates post 
                                                      
1 The slogan of Mosi Lager is “Truly Zambian, Truly Refreshing” 
2 “Zambia: Mosi Lager Gets a Thundering Rebrand.” LusakaTimes, 2 June 2017. 
3 Ibid 
4 Zambia Launch ‘Zambia Plus’ Economic Recovery Program.” ZambiaInvest, 25 Oct. 2016 
5 Dillard, Dudley. 1954. “The Theory of a Monetary Economy.” In K. Kurihawa, ed., Post Keynesian 
Economics. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, (pg. 30) 
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 1970s: the decade that marked the beginning of the neoliberal era. High growth rates are, of 
course, not the only indicator of development. The experience of the East Asian Miracle 
exemplifies how important the role of the state is in taking on the initial amount of risk 
required to develop an economy and promote inclusive development. Thus, the experience of 
Zambia’s privatization provides a clear case of Ha-Joon Chang’s ‘Kicking Away the Ladder’ 
by exposing the hypocrisy of the market-friendly recommendations made by the World Bank 
and the IMF. 
The market-friendly approach has left Zambia, along with the rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with an un-“friendly” amount of debt. Unsustainable debt is one of the largest threats 
facing Zambia. 6 High levels of debt are a direct result of the supply side approach, as it was 
believed that higher levels of borrowing would translate to higher levels of economic growth. 
Increasingly pessimistic “animal spirits” reflect a looming financial crisis.  
The Zambia government is not, however, unfamiliar with the demand side approach 
as exemplified with the recent tax policy. As Ruml stated, a government has the ability to 
“express public policy in subsidizing or in penalizing various industries and economic 
groups” through the implementation of its tax strategy.7 The tax policy now reflects national 
interests. The firm stance on First Quantum Minerals suggests the Zambian government is 
employing its tax program to improve the behaviour of the foreign-owned mining operations.  
Results from the SAM indicate possible suggestions for a new Zambian Consensus. 
Improvement of rural sector capital development, strengthening institutions, updating of 
stock-flow consistent national accounting methods, finding a balance between the market-
friendly and the protectionist approach, and a sovereign debt and tax policy will all result in a 
Zambian Consensus that is “truly Zambian, truly refreshing.” 
                                                      
6 This is what Keynes wanted to avoid when he proposed Bancor, a currency with the goal of clearing 
international debt to reduce exchange rate bias. 
7 Ruml, Beardsley. “Taxes for Revenue Are Obsolete.” American Affairs, Jan. 1946. 
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